• I mentioned in class a few famous/notable cases involving interesting guideline calculation issues, and here now are some links to facilitate further reading for those who might be interested. 

    Let's start with Michael Vick, whose case is in the news again these days.  As you may recall, Vick pleaded guilty (like our friend Kent) and you can/should check out his plea agreement and the case's fact summary.  Notably, the plea agreement stipulated to an ultimate offense level to 13 for a guideline range of 12-18 months.  But, a "Brief of Amici Curaie" filed by a group of "organizations concerned about animal welfare and responsible dog ownership" can be access here, and it asserted (1) that the "agreed upon offense level does not adequately reflect the nature of Vick's conduct nor his role in the offense," (2) that Vick's guideline offense level should be 20 and his sentencing range 33-41 months, (3) the court should impose a 57-month sentence and a $250,000 fine. 

    Now on to Victor Rita, whose case was the subject of the Rita v. US ruling by the Supreme Court that appears at pp. 199-210 in our casebook.   Though I got the exact facts of Rita's crimes a bit off in class, I am right about how a cross-reference increased his guideline range.  Here are snippet's from the Supreme Court's discussion of how Victor Rita got in trouble and ended up faced a guideline sentencing range of 33-41 months:

    The basic crime in this case concerns two false statements which Victor Rita, the petitioner, made under oath to a federal grand jury.  The jury was investigating a gun company called InterOrdnance….  The investigating prosecutor brought Rita before the grand jury, placed him under oath [and] Rita denied that the Government agent had asked him for [a machine gun] kit, and also denied that he had spoken soon thereafter about the [gun] kit to someone at InterOrdnance.  The Government claimed these statements were false, charged Rita with perjury, making false statements, and obstructing justice, and, after a jury trial, obtained convictions on all counts….

    [P]ursuant to the Guidelines, the [presentence] report, in calculating a recommended sentence, groups the five counts of conviction together, treating them as if they amounted to the single most serious count among them (and ignoring all others). See USSG §3D1.1. The single most serious offense in Rita’s case is “perjury.”  The relevant Guideline, §2J1.3(c)(1), instructs the sentencing court (and the probation officer) to calculate the Guidelines sentence for “perjury . . . in respect to a criminal offense” by applying the Guideline for an “accessory after the fact,” as to that criminal offense. §2X3.1.  And that latter Guideline says that the judge, for calculation purposes, should take as a base offense level, a level that is “6 levels lower than the offense level for the underlying offense."  Here the “underlying offense” consisted of InterOrdnance’s possible violation of the machinegun registration law. The base offense level for the gun registration crime is 26.  See USSG §2M5.2.  Six levels less is 20.  And 20, says the presentence report, is the base offense level applicable to Rita for purposes of Guidelines sentence calculation.

    Students will get lots and lots of bonus particulation points by using the comments for either (a) expressing interest in (and/or providing links to) other interesting guideline calculation cases, or (b)expressing in rank order with explaination how they think Kent, Vick and Rita stack up in terms of offense culpability and the purposes of punishment.  (Lots of thoughtful comments will also increase the chances I will cancel Friday's class.)

  • Especially in light of some recent and past class discussions, everyone might be interested in these two recent posts from my main blog about Ohio happenings:

    Also, students already looking for a different (and fresh) perspective on federal sentencing discretion and the limits of law might want to check out the article references in this post: Deep thoughts about post-Booker sentencing and sources of law.

  • As I mentioned in class, I am open to lots of different ways to review and reflect on the mid-term paper experience.  I especially like the idea of circulating (without identification) all the papers for all to see.  But I want to provide everyone a chance to object to this tentative plan (via comments or e-mails to me).

    In addition, I am eager to hear ideas for going "off the board" concerning how we might review the mid-term paper exercise: i.e., folks should feel free to make novel suggestions concerning how to make the most of the mid-term experience.

    Speaking of going "off the board," Jonathan was kind enough to help me find this YouTube link to a classic clip of the old Joker's Wild game show.  There is a reference to going "off the board" around the 2:15 mark.  (Also, this clip should make every feel good about being smarter than some folks were in the 1970s.)

  • We will return to our discussion of the sentencing of former federal district judge Samuel Kent in class this week, and everyone should be sure to review again all the key case documents (here and here) and your own proposed pre-guideline and guideline sentence for defendant Kent. 

    You should recall that, in our discussion just before break, students proposed a prison sentence as low as six months and as high as 15 years for defendant Kent.  Though I did not make much of the fact before, I do not think it was mere coincidence that a male "judge" proposed the lowest sentence for Kent and that a female "judge" proposed the highest sentence for Kent. As I have noted before and will note again and again, gendered realities (both conscious and unconscious) clearly play a significant role in how sex offense cases are handled.

    Some of you have at times expressed concern about how often I tend to bring gendered perspectives into our class discussions.  To help you understand why I often obsess over gendered realities in law and practice, consider this new research I just came across.  The article, which is titled "From Lawyer to Judge: Advancement, Sex, and Name-Calling," has nothing to do with sentencing, but it does provide some worrisome insights into how lawyers judge one another.  Here is the abstract:

    This paper provides the first empirical test of the Portia Hypothesis: females with masculine monikers are more successful in legal careers. Utilizing South Carolina microdata, we look for correlation between an individual's advancement to a judgeship and his/her name's masculinity, which we construct from the joint empirical distribution of names and gender in the state's entire population of registered voters. We find robust evidence that nominally masculine females are favored over other females. Hence, our results support the Portia Hypothesis.

  • Though I doubt we will have too much extra time to talk about all the interesting sentencing developments of the last few weeks, I thought it might still be useful to spotlight here some posts from my main blog highlights some of the biggest news of the break week that was:

  • As we ended class, it was obvious to me that many were troubled by my use of the "term" rapist to describe former Judge Kent.  Though I would be happy to have folks comment/debate on that label, a more contemporary and valuable label to consider is "sex offender."  Specifically, I am eager for everyone to consider (both in social and legal terms) whether the sex offender label can and should be affixed on Judge Kent in light of his admitted behavior.

    As you think about this question in legal terms, keep in mind some of the legal consequences of this label.  Sex offenders are now required to register in all states, and in many jurisdictions they are prohibited from living or working in certain places.  They are also often prohibited from being involved in traditional Halloween festivities and a number of other activities many take for granted.

    Finally, as you reflect on these issues, consider also the classic "who" question: which legal actor in the sentencing process should get to decide whether Judge Kent is to be legally considered a sex offender?

  • I heartily encourage students using a variety of different means to try to figure out what kind of (now advisory) guideline sentence former Judge Kent is to be facing.  But I also wanted to help folks get a running start with these links to materials provides on the official website of the US Sentencing Commission:

    Also, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 1B1.1 Application Instructions might prove useful, along with lots of other stuff to be found at the USSC website and elsewhere.

  • As mentioned in prior posts and in class, our in-class examination of non-capital sentencing and of modern sentencing reforms will focus — at times a lot and at times a little — on the real case of former federal district judge Samuel Kent.  There is lots and lots of background information about this case available on the web, including this effective  this effective March 2 piece from the Texas Lawyer, headlined "What's Next for Samuel Kent in Wake of Guilty Plea?".  But for purposes of our class discussion, the only essential reading are these key legal documents from the case:

    This case and these documents should enable us to discuss effectively many of the challenging legal and policy issues covered in chapters 3 through 8.  Though I doubt we will get a chance in class to review systematically all the readings/ideas set forth in all these chapters, you should be able to find useful readings on a range of relevant topics from all those chapters as they apply to former Judge Kent's case.  And, if there are particular issues relating to former Judge Kent's upcoming sentencing that you want to make sure we discuss in class, please feel free to use the comments (or class time) to spotlight issues you want to make sure we cover.

  • We have two weeks together before Spring Break, and I wanted to make sure everyone knew my plans for these weeks:

    1.  The first week's classes will have us wrap up our discussion of the death penalty, with Wednesday's class focused on the Ted Kaczynski hypo (details here) and Friday's class dedicated to an "open forum" on whatever capital punishment topics students would like to review.

    2.  The second week's classes will jump us into the law and policy on non-capital sentencing, during which I want to use the upcoming sentencing of former federal judge Samuel Kent as a focal point for discussion.  Look for a series of Kent-related documents and activities posted on this blog over the next few days.

    During any (or all) of these classes, I am happy to discuss further my expectation for the mid-term and final papers.

  • Inspired by a comment by Shawn to another post, I thought it might be valuable to again review all the recent discussion of the economic costs of the death penalty.  It has long been clear that the administration of capital punishment is a costly affair, though only now in tough budget times do we see politicans discussing this reality with emphasis and proposals for reform.  Whatever one might think of the merits of these arguments (which folks are welcome to discuss in the comments), these links to posts at my main blog highlight that the idea is getting a lot of media attention in recent weeks:

    Some recent posts noting media discussion of death penalty costs and reform proposals:

  • I apologize for taking up (too?) much of class on Wednesday telling the war story of my very first real legal experience after law school (but perhaps a real-world war story about a non-capital case was a useful break from what we have been doing lately). If you want to read the Second Circuit's opinion in United States of America v. Caroline Oyibo Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993), it is available at this link (and elsewhere on-line, of course).

    In addition, I mentioned that the mens rea sentencing issue in Ekwunoh is discussed in the casebook (see pp. 321-25), and is also the subject recent Supreme Court debate in some other contexts.  Specifically, check out the links and other materials about these cases recently argued over before SCOTUS:

    Flores-Figueroa v. United States (08-108) (argued Feb 25) —  concerning mens rea needed to trigger two-year mandatory sentence under federal identity theft law.

    Dean v. United States (08-5274) (argued Feb 25)— concerning mens rea needed to trigger ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for discharging a gun during a violent crime.

    Though I may in subsequent posts give everyone a distinct opportunity to talk about, e.g., whether you'd like more war stories and/or whether you understand the class's paper requirements and/or whether I effectively explained the methods of my madness, all those topics are also fair game in the comments to this post since we will not be together again for a full week.

  • Population-large Though we likely won't formally transition to non-capital sentencing topics until next week (or maybe even the week after), I wanted to start that transition on the blog by highlighting a new report from the Pew Center on the States, titled "One in 31: The Long Reach of America Corrections."  The full report — which provide an effective "gold-standard" model for what a great final paper might look like – is available at this link.  I have blog coverage of the report at SL&P here and here.

    The Columbus Dispatch provides a local spin on the report with this article, headlined "Punished population soars in Ohio, U.S." Here is the start of the Dispatch article:

    One in every 25 adult Ohioans is in prison, jail or on parole or probation, a study by the Pew Center on the States shows. While the national average is one in 31 U.S. adults, the numbers are more dramatic for Latinos (one in 27), men (one in 18), and blacks (one in 11), according to One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections, released yesterday.

    Ohio's one-in-25 rate was sixth among the states. Georgia had the highest at one in 13, and New Hampshire the lowest at one in 88.

    The first-of-a-kind study showed a huge jump in the corrections rate since 1984, when it was one in 77 Americans. Nationally, there were 7.3 million people in prison, jail, on parole or on probation in 2007. Of those, 351,879 were in Ohio — about 50,000 in state prisons, with the vast majority in community corrections facilities, on parole or on probation.

    At a time when states are facing the worst financial crunch in decades, spending on corrections continues to be one of the fastest-growing pieces of state budgets, second only to Medicaid in the past two decades, the Pew Center concluded. The national cost to taxpayers for all forms of corrections is $68 billion annually. The study said $1 out of every $15 in discretionary state spending goes to prisons.

    The Dispatch also has this webpage seeking reader input, titled "The Hot Issue: Would you rather see Ohio build more prisons or put more offenders on probation?".  As of this writing, the on-line voting is very close (but on-line voter "turn-out" is low).

  • inspired in part by our class discussions of prosecutorial discretion in capital cases, I have done a serius of recent posts at my main blog that focus on prosecutorial sentencing discretion.  All the posts linked below are worth checking out (along with the comments), and the first linked post is especially on-point in light of our conversations during Friday's class:

  • In order to effectively draw lessons about the modern realities of modern death penalty law, I encourage everyone to try to seriously imagine how one might seek as a defense attorney to avoid a death sentence for Theodore Kaczynski under the capital punishment statutes of Florida, Ohio and Texas.  To aid in this endeavor, it will be useful to read up on Ted's life history and crimes.  Here are some links to help with this task:

    1.  Wikipedia's entry on Theodore Kaczynski is pretty effective and has lots of additional links for additional information.

    2.  Court TV has this on-line archive with lots of reporting and information/links about Ted and his federal prosecution.

    3.  Time Magazine published this fascinating article about Ted 10 years ago.  The headline and sub-heading of the article gives you a taste of some of its notable content:

    "I Don't Want To Live Long. I Would Rather Get The Death Penalty Than Spend The Rest Of My Life In Prison": Ted Kaczynski talks about life in jail, his appeal plans and his brother David, who still struggles over the decision to turn in the Unabomber.

  • I mentioned in class an article about victim participation in the death penalty process.  That article, titled "Their Day in Court: The Role of Murder Victims' Families in Capital Juror Decision Making," can be accessed at this link.  I recommend the whole piece, but here are some snippets of particular note as we get into discussion of racial and gender bias in the application of the death penalty:

    When we cross-tabulated co-victims' testimony for the prosecution with the victim's race, we discovered a very significant finding: the co-victims of a white murder victim were more likely to offer testimony than the co-victims of a nonwhite victim….

    [W]e find that jurors tend to be less concerned about the suffering of nonwhite-victim families than with white-victim families…. It is possible that since families of nonwhite victims testify much less often (perhaps as a result of institutionalized racism or their own feelings about capital punishment), their place in the minds of jurors is diminished. As a matter of policy, we would strongly encourage greater participation of family members of nonwhite victims in capital trials because their [testimony] may make their side of the story increasingly memorable to jurors. Although the findings we report do not show dramatic differences between whites and nonwhites in terms of participation, the evidence that jurors exhibit racially biased attitudes is statistically significant, and it is discouraging to see race bias plague yet another area of capital punishment.

    Among the points worthy of reflection here is that this study is only seeking and able to examine the impact of victims in capital cases that go to trial.  Yet there is little doubt that victims can and often do have a profound impact on prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions in capital cases. 

    I am inclined to speculate that the racial biases discussed in this article with respect to jury decision-making could be even more profound with respect to prosecutorial decision-making in capital cases.  And yet this is only rank speculation because prosecutorial decision-making in capital cases is rarely studied or even subject to measurement through effective data.

  • Especially as we are unpacking the past and present reality of who imposes death sentences, a new analysis of the death penalty and plea bargaining realities merits our collective attention.  The analysis appears in this new working paper, titled "The Death Penalty and Plea Bargaining to Life Sentences."  I discuss the report (and link to other notable posts on the topic) here at my main blog, and in light of our recent classroom discussion I wanted to spotlight one particular passage from the paper:

    [Here is an accounting of] the disposition of cases in the sample used in this study. For every 100 suspects arrested by the police and charged with murder, 19 cases were rejected at initial screening and 81 went forward.  Of the 81, 42 went to trial and 39 pleaded guilty.  Of the 42 trials, 8 were acquittals and 34 were convictions.  Thus, of the 81 cases carried forward, 73 ended in convictions of some crime, though not necessarily of murder.  Of these, 65 were sentenced to incarceration of more than one year.

  • The Dayton Daily News has an extraordinary collection of materials at this link under the heading "Special report: Death row in Ohio." Here is how the paper sets up its work:

    About this series: For many convicted murderers, a death sentence doesn't really mean death. Since Ohio's current death penalty was put into effect, 28 people have died from state-ordered lethal injections — and 71 have walked off death row because of successful appeals.

    Especially in light of our continuing discussion of McGautha and Furman and Gregg (and eventually McKlesky), this particular article from the series may deserve special attention: "Worst of the worst eludes death."

    And, speaking of the worst of the worst, as some of you may already know, the modern story of the death penalty in Ohio will soon include yet another Supreme Court chapter as a result of the Justices decision earlier this week to take up another capital case from Ohio.  This article from the Cleveland Plain-Dealer provides the basic back-story:

    For the second time, the U.S. Supreme Court will consider whether Frank Spisak should be executed for killing three people at Cleveland State University. The high court announced Monday that it will hear the arguments after years of appellate disputes over the effectiveness of Spisak's legal counsel and the instructions jurors received at his trial….

    Spisak, 57, was sentenced to death in 1983 after a four-week trial that included testimony that Spisak was a neo-Nazi and cross-dresser. A jury convicted him of the 1982 killings of the Rev. Horace Rickerson; Brian Warford, a CSU student; and Timothy Sheehan, CSU's assistant superintendent for buildings and grounds. Sheehan was the father of Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Brendan Sheehan.

    The 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 2006 that Spisak's death sentence should be dropped, and a new sentencing hearing should be set. The appellate court said defense attorneys "demonized" Spisak in closing arguments during the sentencing phase of the trial. It also said jury instructions as to the death penalty were unconstitutional. Specifically, the instructions during the sentencing phase erroneously required the jury to be unanimous in its findings that Spisak should not be executed.

  • For those interested in a little more information about the history of the death penalty in the United States, the Death Penalty Information Center has an effective summary at this link

  • This week we will turn this week from broad discussion of capital punishment theories and practices to a focused discussion of constitutional doctrine.  (And here is a reminder that everyone should be prepared to discuss the McGautha case.)  But this great newspaper article, headlined "Firing squads are more humane, experts say," provides a great overview of how different death penalty theories and practices intersect when we consider execution methods.  Here are some notable snippets from the article:

    Rep. Delmar Burridge knows his death penalty bill isn’t going anywhere this legislative session. His bill to bring back the firing squad as punishment for gun-related murders didn’t have a single sympathizer during a recent House committee hearing, and Burridge said he brought the proposal forward to make a point, not new law.

    But some execution experts say that the Keene Democrat’s proposal should get a fair hearing. Firing squads, they say, may look old-fashioned and barbaric, but they may be more humane than other methods.

    A 1993 study that examined the pain associated with different execution methods had firing squad ranked close to lethal injection. But that research came before more recent reports about problems with lethal injections — incompetent executioners, medically complicated inmates and otherwise botched executions — that have led five states to put executions on hold as they consider ways to improve the status quo.

    “That’s definitely something worth investigating,” said Deborah Denno, a professor at Fordham Law School in New York who has studied execution methods for 18 years and testified in state and federal courts about lethal injection. “There’s evidence that (a firing squad) could be the most humane method that’s currently available.”…

    Burridge said he chose the method primarily for its public-relations value. He said he thought a death by shooting might be more likely to stick in the minds of would-be criminals and deter them from committing crimes using guns. “I call it the enhanced death penalty,” he said. “You’ve got to love the marketing.”…

    Worldwide, firing squad is the most common method of execution. But it’s generally associated with “repressive governments,” including Libya, Cuba, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, said David Fathi, the U.S. program director at Human Rights Watch. His organization, which opposes the death penalty, authored an influential report in 2006 outlining failings in the states’ lethal injection protocols. But despite those problems, Fathi did not agree that New Hampshire should choose the firing squad. “These are not countries that we generally strive to emulate,” he said….

    One strong argument in favor of lethal injection and against the firing squad is the appearance of the execution. Lethal injection looks dignified and painless to watchers, said Richard Dieter of the Death Penalty Information Center. “The guards, the wardens, the witnesses probably do not want five rifles going off and a bloody person bleeding to death in front of them,” Dieter said. “I think these methods are partially chosen for their appearance.”…

    On this very blog, back when it was used as a resource for the death penalty course taught at Moritz in Spring 2007, students can find lots and lots of posts on execution methods:

  • Because I found today's guest lecturer so interesting, I am sorry we did not have hours and hours to continue discussing what our guest said and how everyone reacted to what she said (and how I (over?)reacted to how others reacted).  Fortunately, we can and should continue these dialogues via this blog (and here people can (and should?) even feel free to post comments anonymously).

    To the extent that persons are interesting in some data on the intersection of gender issues and the death penalty, this link at the Death Penalty Information Center provides lots of details about notably few women offenders have been set to death row and executed in the United States in the modern era.

    As for the significance of the victim's gender, this recent study states that its "examination of prosecutorial and jury decision making reveals that although victim gender has little impact on prosecutorial decisions, it has a meaningful impact on jury decisions."  However, this slightly older article, which is focused particularly on Ohio cases, reports findings indicating "that homicides with white female victims were more likely to result in death sentences than other victim race-gender dyads."

    So, comment away…

  • Our class conversation on Wednesday confirmed my instinct that there is a lot we can and should learn by extra attention to the litigation and outcome in the Kennedy child rape capital case decision by the Supreme Court last summer.  Helpfully, the blog Sex Crimes has this terrific resource page with lots and lots of links to lots and lots of materials and commentary about the case.

    On that page you can find this link to the full Supreme Court opinion in Kennedy.  Here are some especially notable passages from the majority opinion in Kennedy (per Justice Kennedy) that I want to highlight as we continue to discuss some theoretical and practical justifications for the death penalty:

    The crime of child rape, considering its reported incidents, occurs more often than first-degree murder. Approximately 5,702 incidents of vaginal, anal, or oral rape of a child under the age of 12 were reported nationwide in 2005; this is almost twice the total incidents of intentional murder for victims of all ages (3,405) reported during the same period.  See Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, National Incident-Based Reporting System, 2005, Study No. 4720, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu (as visited June 12, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Although we have no reliable statistics on convictions for child rape, we can surmise that, each year, there are hundreds, or more, of these convictions just in jurisdictions that permit capital punishment. Cf. Brief for Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 1–2, and n. 2 (noting that there are now at least 70 capital rape indictments pending in Louisiana and estimating the actual number to be over 100).  As a result of existing rules, see generally Godfrey, 446 U. S., at 428–433 (plurality opinion), only 2.2% of convicted first-degree murderers are sentenced to death, see Blume, Eisenberg, & Wells, Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. of Empirical Legal Studies 165, 171 (2004). But under respondent’s approach, the 36 States that permit the death penalty could sentence to death all persons convicted of raping a child less than 12 years of age. This could not be reconciled with our evolving standards of decency and the necessity to constrain the use of the death penalty….

    Society’s desire to inflict the death penalty for child rape by enlisting the child victim to assist it over the course of years in asking for capital punishment forces a moral choice on the child, who is not of mature age to make that choice. The way the death penalty here involves the child victim in its enforcement can compromise a decent legal system; and this is but a subset of fundamental difficulties capital punishment can cause in the administration and enforcement of laws proscribing child rape.

    There are, moreover, serious systemic concerns in prosecuting the crime of child rape that are relevant to the constitutionality of making it a capital offense. The problem of unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony means there is a “special risk of wrongful execution” in some child rape cases. Atkins, supra, at 321. See also Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 5–17. This undermines, at least to some degree, the meaningful contribution of the death penalty to legitimate goals of punishment….

    With respect to deterrence, if the death penalty adds to the risk of non-reporting, that, too, diminishes the penalty’s objectives. Underreporting is a common problem with respect to child sexual abuse…. Although we know little about what differentiates those who report from those who do not report, one of the most commonly cited reasons for nondisclosure is fear of negative consequences for the perpetrator, a concern that has special force where the abuser is a family member. The experience of the amici who work with child victims indicates that, when the punishment is death, both the victim and the victim’s family members may be more likely to shield the perpetrator from discovery, thus increasing underreporting. See Brief for National Association of Social Workers et al. as Amici Curiae 11–13. As a result, punishment by death may not result in more deterrence or more effective enforcement.

    In addition, by in effect making the punishment for child rape and murder equivalent, a State that punishes child rape by death may remove a strong incentive for the rapist not to kill the victim. Assuming the offender behaves in a rational way, as one must to justify the penalty on grounds of deterrence, the penalty in some respects gives less protection, not more, to the victim, who is often the sole witness to the crime. See Rayburn, Better Dead Than R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 St. John’s L. Rev. 1119, 1159–1160 (2004). It might be argued that, even if the death penalty results in a marginal increase in the incentive to kill, this is counterbalanced by a marginally increased deterrent to commit the crime at all. Whatever balance the legislature strikes, however, uncertainty on the point makes the argument for the penalty less compelling than for homicide crimes.

  • While we were starting to work through some "who" issues in class today, an Ohio agency made a notable decision in a notable death penalty case.  Here are the basics from this Columbus Dispatch article:

    A Hamilton County man who stabbed his 62-year-old mother to death while he was on a crack-cocaine binge should not be executed and should be released in as little as seven years, the Ohio Parole Board recommended to Gov. Ted Strickland.

    Jeffrey Hill, 44, is scheduled to be lethally injected March 3 at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility near Lucasville unless Strickland or a court intervenes. Parole board members were clearly impressed with what a report released today called the "compelling and unanimous opinion" of the family of victim Emma Hill that her son and killer should not be executed. "They have suffered tremendous loss, and execution would add further to their suffering," the board said.

    Hamilton County Prosecutor Joseph T. Deters, a strong capital punishment supporter, opposed clemency.  But he said today he will no longer pursue it given the parole board recommendation and strong support from the family.  "I would have preferred he stayed in jail the rest of his life," Deters said. "We've done our job. Part of the law says this is something the governor can do."

    The board recommended to Strickland that Hill's death sentence be commuted to life in prison with parole eligibility after 25 years, meaning he could be released in as little as seven years.

    Hill was high on crack cocaine on March 23, 1991, when he stabbed his mother 10 times in the back and chest, stole $100 and made two trips to buy cocaine.  In a letter to the editor last month [available here], Hill's uncle, Eddie Sanders of Mount Healthy, urged public support for clemency….

    All county, state and federal courts have upheld Hills conviction and death sentence.

    Though everyone is encourage to comment on any aspect of this story, I would be especially interested in whether anyone might be able to develop a viable argument suggesting that Governor Strickland ought not follow the parole board's recommendation.

    UPDATE:  I just found this link to the Ohio Parole Board's full order in this case.

  • in its punishment of Michael Phelps?  Here is the organization's official statement:

    USA Swimming has reprimanded Michael Phelps under its Code of Conduct by withdrawing financial support and the eligibility to compete for a period of three months effective today, Feb. 5, 2009.

    This is not a situation where any anti-doping rule was violated, but we decided to send a strong message to Michael because he disappointed so many people, particularly the hundreds of thousands of USA Swimming member kids who look up to him as a role model and a hero.

    Michael has voluntarily accepted this reprimand and has committed to earn back our trust.

    Some related posts from my other blog:

  • Though we could follow up on many points discussed in Wednesday's class in many ways, I wanted to here to link to recent reports (both long and short) to help get you thinking more about the different ways that different groups package their sentencing insights.

    First, here is a linkto the full New York sentencing report from the state's Commission on Sentencing Reform. (This report runs a tree-frightening 326 pdf pages).  Second, here is a linkto a new report The Sentencing Project, which highlights 17 states that enacted sentencing and corrections reforms in 2008.  (This report is an eco-friendly 17 pdf pages). 

    Also, a new law review article discussed here provides a thoughtful perspective on equality issues that we will discuss during Friday's class and that we will struggle with through the semester.  (This article is not (yet) required reading, but it is right now highly recommended.)

  • I mentioned in our first class together that every important public policy issues can be seen as a sentencing issue.  A great timely example of this comes from the budget proposals put forth by Ohio's governor yesterday.  Of course, this lead story from the Columbus Dispatch does not focus on sentencing issues.  But, as detailed in the 3-page attachment linked below, paged D-70 to D-72 of the proposed executive budget have a lot to say about sentencing and punishment.  Consider these snippets from these pages:

    The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s (DRC) institutional population is at an all-time high and projects to keep growing. In 1971, the institutional population was 9,129. Of every 100,000 Ohio residents, 85 were incarcerated in a state prison. DRC ended calendar year 2008 with a prison population of 50,887, meaning that 443 of every 100,000 Ohio residents (586 out of every 100,000 adult residents) were incarcerated in a state prison. As shown in the chart below, DRC has predicted substantial increases in the prison population over the next ten years, reaching 59,846 in 2018.

    Skyrocketing intakes (admissions to the DRC system) from calendar years 2002 to 2008 have been a primary driver of the increase in prison population. The number of prisoners who entered the DRC system a given year increased 25.4 percent, from 21,787 in 2002 to 29,069 in 2008. This increase in the annual intake rate has increased average sentence lengths, continuing to create upward pressure on the prison population. During fiscal year 2008, approximately 57 percent of inmates committed into the DRC system were low-level felony four (F-4) and felony five (F-5) offenders, whose lengths of stay average a little less than one year and cost the state hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

    This Executive Budget proposes several reforms to criminal sentencing in Ohio, in an effort to cautiously and judiciously reduce the prison population and the associated substantial costs to taxpayers. The targets of these reforms are low-level, non-violent offenders, who drive the booming prison population. Reversing the current trend of population growth is imperative to the fiscal health of the state.

    Download Ohio Budget Sentencing and Correctional Reform

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